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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

-vs.CLINTON H ANDERSON, RUTH C. McOMBER, HARRY BERMAN, JOSEPH
JERRY JEREMY and JACQUELINE
JEREMY, his wife, ROBERT J. McRAE,
MRS. ROBERT J. McRAE, his wife,
CHARLES C. CHAFFEE, JR., and MRS.
CHARLES C. CHAFFEE, JR., his wife,
Defendants.
and
HARRY BERMAN,
Cross-complainant and Appellant,

No. 9566

-vs.JOSEPH JERRY JEREMY and JACQUELINE JEREMY, his wife,
Cross-defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~T

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action wherein defendant and cross-complainant, Harry Berman, seeks judgement against de1
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fendants and cross-defendants, Joseph Jerry Jeremy and
Jacqueline Jeremy on a certain promissory note.
DISPOSIT'ION IN LOvVER COURT
The case was tried to the Court, sitting without a
jury. The trial court found in favor of the said crossdefendants and against the cross-complainant, no cause
of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Cross-complainant seeks reversal of the judgment
and for judgment against the cross-defendants, or a new
trial.
STAT'EJ\ifENT OF FACTS
The original action was brought by the plaintiff,
American Savings & Loan Association as first mortgage
holder to foreclose its mortgage on real property located
in Salt Lake City, Utah. The cross-defendants had sold
this residence property to defendant Ruth C. McOmber.
A friend of McOmber, defendant ·Clinton H. Anderson,
co-signed a note ·with :McOmber as part payment on this
home and delivered the smne to cross-defendants Jeremy.
Anderson and J\ifcOmber also each signed second mortgages to secure the note and delivered the same to the
cross-defendants.
Cross-complainant, Harry Berman, owned a home
in Salt Lake City which he listed for sale with Bettilyons,
2
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real estate brokers (Tr. 44). The contract with Bettilyons
provided for a multiple listing of the property (Tr. 148).
The defendants Jeremy were searching for a home to
purchase (Tr. 122). A sales lady for Holt-Webber Real
Estate Agency interested the Jeremys in the Berman
home and made arrangements for Mrs. Jeremy to see the
home. After Mrs. Jeremy had examined the premises,
she later returned with her husband to see the Berman
home. They liked the home and told their sales lady that
if Berman would accept the $4500.00 note that theiJ had
received from Anderson and McOmber as partial down
payment, they would buy the Berman home (Tr. 7 and
123). Negotiations between the parties for the sale of
the Berman home were handled by the Holt-Webber
Agency (Tr. 8 and 123). The necessary documents for
closing the sale were prepared by this same broker (T·r.
8). The real estate broker delivered the $4500.00 note to
Berman as part of the down payment (Tr. 9). At this
time, the note was payable to the order of the J eremys
and had not been endorsed (Exhibit 1, Tr. 13, and 198).
Together with the note, and by separate instrument,
Berman received Exhibit D and CP-5 which is an assign-.
ment of the note in question. The J eremys claim they did
not wish to be bound personally on the note and conveyed
this information to Sterling vVebber, a partner in the
Holt-vVebber Real Estate Agency (Tr. 198). Webber
acknowledged having a conversation with the J eremys
concerning endorsement of the note but could not remember ever relaying this information to Berman (Tr. 157,
161, 165-167). Berman denied ever having discussed the
3
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matter of endorsement with anyone before or at the time
ofsale (T'r. 259 and 260).
Several months after the J eremys took possession of
the Berman home, they were contacted by Berman and
asked if he could come to their home and have the note
endorsed by them. Mr. J eren1y told him that because of
a previous engagement they would have to delay the meeting to the following day. Berman and his wife came to
the Jeremy home with the note in question and requested
the Jeremy to endorse the note. :.Mr. Jeremy went to a
telephone in another room and contacted his attorney to
inquire about signing the note, and was told to endorse
the note without recourse which he and Mrs. Jeremy then
did (Tr.13 and 14, 200, 201).
The holder of the first mortgage on the hon1e the
J eremys sold, sued to foreclose the mortgage and named
the J eremys and Berman as defendants by virtue of the
second mortgages given by Anderson and :11c0mber and
assigned to Berman.
The negotiations for the sale of the Berman home,
together with the preparation of the necessary documents
for sale were handled by the Holt-\V ebber real estate
agency with the knowledge of the J eremys and Berman
(Tr. 7, 8, 30, 31, 32, 260, 123, 15-±, 158, 16-±). Neither of
the J ere1nys ever talked with Bern1an concerning the
transaction and the assignment of the $4500.00 note (Tr.
140, 237), except they represented to Berman that the
$4500.00 note was as good as gold (Tr. 193, 201, 203, 204,
243, 244). The J eremys never told the real estate broker
4
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how to arrange for transfer of the note but left the entire
matter in the hands of the broker (T'r. 236). When Berman presented the note to them for their endorsement
they did not tell him that they did not wish to be bound on
the note but endorsed it "without recourse" after talking
with their attorney by telephone ( Tr. 200).

POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL
I. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN UNQUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT FROM THE RESPONDENTS AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
II. APPELLANT WAS NOT BOUND BY THE UNDISCLOSED COLLATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
JEREMYS AND THEIR REAL ESTATE BROKER.
III. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BERMAN
AGREED TO ACCEPT A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT ON
THE NOTE.

ARGUl\iENT
I. APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN UNQUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT FROM THE RESPONDENTS AS A
MATTER OF LAW.

The note transferred by the Jeremys to Berman had
not been endorsed at the time of the transfer and Berman
could later require their endorsement. Title 44-1-50, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
''Where the holder of an instrument payable
to his order transfers it for value without endorsing it, the transfer vests in the transferee such
title as the transferor had therein; and the trans5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

feree acquires, in addition, the right to have the
endorsement of the transferor ... "
This statute conforms to the negotiable instruments law.
It has been uniformly held by this court, and courts of
other jurisdictions, that the transferee is entitled to an
unqualified endorsement. In the case of Ackerman vs.
Bramwell Investment Company, et al, 80 Utah 52, 12
Pac. 2d 623, wherein the defendant transferred a note
payable to the defendant and accompanied the delivery
of the unendorsed note by a separate agreement of assignment, assigning all the right, title and interest in the note
to the plaintiff, this court held that the assignment, being
contemporaneous with the transfer and purchase of the
note will, with its transfer and delivery, he regarded as
an endorsement.
In the case of Pritchard vs. Strike, et al, 66 Utah 394,
243 Pac. 114, this court stated at page 402 :
orbit
"Thus we think that one endorsing a negotiable promissory note and desiring to disclaim
the responsiblity of an endorser must, by appropriate words, clearly indicate such an intention
or an intention to be bound in some other capacity,
and that he does not do so by language as here
assigning and delivering all his right, title and
interest in the note, which is nothing more than
what the law implies from a blank or general
endorsement without words creating the implication, and hence is but the expression of a clause
which t.he law implies, and works nothing.''
This matter is discussed in an annotation in 87 ALR,
at page 1189, wherein the author states:

6
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"In accordance with the provisiOns of 49
of the Act, it is unifonnly held that one taking
a negotiable instrument by transfer without endorsement is entitled to have the endorsement
of his trensferor and that he may compel such
endorsement by legal process. It also appears to
be the rule that, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, the transferee is entitled to an
unqualified endorsement; and that such endorsemen may be compelled although the instrument
was taken after maturity."
,gee also Lawrence vs. Citizen's State Bank (Kansas), 113 l{an. 724, 216 Pac. 262, wherein the court held
that a transferee was entitled to an unqualified endorsement, stating that an endorsement without recourse was
unacceptable. In accord, se.e Queensboro National Bank
of the City of New York vs. Kelly, 48 Fed. 2d 574.
In the case of 1\iiller vs. Shelby County Investment
Company, 30 S. W. 2d 668, the court therin held that
an agreement to transfer a note is prima facie an agreement to transfer in the usual way by endorsement.
Other courts have eonsidered the effect of transferring a note by separate assignment. In the ease of
Parr vs. Fort Pierce Bank & Trust Company, 100 Florida
941, 130 Southern 445, at page 447, the eourt stated:
"The· fact that she accepted an assignment
by a separate written instrument does not evidence
an agreement upon her part to accept a qualified
endorsement."
The facts in the Parr case showed that the plaintiff
purchased several promiss-ory notes from the defendant
7
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bank. The bank transferred the notes to the plaintiff
by a separate document of assignment but did not endorse the notes. The makers of the notes defaulted
and plaintiff sought an unqualified endorsement from
the bank, which was refused. The court in discussing
the matter said at page 448 :
''If at the time of the transfer the parties
are silent upon the subject of endorsement, then
the law implies an agreement by the transferor
to endorse a negotiable instrument when it is
made payable to his orde·r.''
In the case of Lawrence vs. Citizen's State Bank, M.anhatten, et al, Supra, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in
discussing the reference of the. negotiable instruments
law to qualified endorsements stated:
"Such an endorsement is not to be inferred;
a restricted endorsement is necessarily the result
of some express or implied understanding, and,
when that is wanting, the right to an endorsement
without any qualifications is one which the statute
confers on the transferee. Otherwise, it was
hardly worthwhile for the legislature to say anything about it."
This court went onto say that the burden of proving
the agreement was on the transferor.
The evidence in our instant case clearly shows that
the respondents never informed the ap!)ellant that they
were not to be bound or liable on the note (Tr. 140,
200, 201, 237, 259, and 260). Appellant respectfully
submits that the trial court erred in refusing to require
the J eremys to give an unqualified endorsement of the
8
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note as there wm; no language of limitation in the
assignment of the note at the time of its transfer to
appellant Berman (Ex. D and CP5), and admittedly
they never talked to him.
II. APPELLANT WAS NOT BOUND BY THE UNDISCLOSED COLLATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
JEREMYS AND THEIR REAL EST ATE BROKER.

The record is clear that Webber, the real estate
broker handling the transaction, was acting in a dual
capacity as agent for all parties ( Tr. 7, 8, 30, 31, 3:2,
123, 154, 158, 164, 197 and 260). In real estate transactions, this situation has been considered by the courts.
In the case of Fuchs vs. Leahy, 321 Missouri 47, 9 S.W.
2d 897, the court held :
"Where two or rnore principals. employ the
same agent, whether as a means of dealing with
one another or to protect their common interests,
one cannot charge the other not actually at fault
·with the misconduct of the combination ... There
is no reason why the misconduct of the agent
should be imputed to one principal rather than
to the other."
See 2 :Meacham on Agency, Second Edition, Section 2140.
The courts considering the problem of a real estate
agent acting on behalf of the buyer and the seller with
the knowledge of both, have concluded that the acts of
the agent and his misconduct should not be imputed to
either party. The courts follow the rule that where
a common agent conceals something, the party damaged
can recover where the party benefiting has accepted
9
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and obtained the advantage even though he did not
authorize or know of the concealment. See Owens vs.
Schneider, 85 Pac. 2d 198 ; also lierdan vs. Hanson,
182 Gal. 5·38, 189 Pac. 440.
Where the agent fraudulently misrepresents the
transaction to the detriment of the buyer and benefit
of the seller, the parties will be held free of the acts
of the agent and the courts will not allow the buyer to
benefit nor the seller to suffer the loss.
In our instant case, the J eremys testified that they
did not instruct 1N ebber, their real estate broker, to
prepare any particular form of transfer of the note,
but left the entire matter to his discretion (Tr. 202,
203 and 236). Berman also testified that he was relying
upon the integrity and advice of the broker and· was
never at any time notified by vVebber that the J eremys
did not wish to be bound on the note (Tr. 259 and 260).
Under this factual situation, it appears clear that
the failure of Webber to disclose all the facts to Berman
should not work to the disadvantage of Berman. By
virtue of the authorities cited above, the lower court
should have required the J eremys to be bound on the
note given by them as part of the purchase price of the
property. To deprive Berman of the endorsement, the
lower court must necessarily violate the general rule
and thereby allow the J eremys to take advantage of
the broker's conceahnent to the detrin1ent of Berman.
If the court were to require the J eremys to endorse
the note and be liable thereon, it would be doing nothing
10
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more than Inaking them pay the full value for the home,
which was the purchase price agreed upon. Respondents
admit that they never told appellant of their desire not
to be liable on the note. The evidence is clear and
unequivocal that at no ti1ne did either Mr. and Mrs.
J ermny ever tell Berman that they did not wish to be
bound personally on the note. They told Berman that
the note was as good as gold, and urged him to accept
it as part of the downpayment on the purpchase price.
Even after Berman received the note and the separate
assignment thereof, nothing was ever said to hi1n by
the real estate broker or the J eremys concerning their
desire not to be bound. Mrs. Jeremy testified that when
Berman called their home and requested tha.t they endorse the note she could not understand why he had
waited so long to ask for the endorsement (T'r. 140).
Mr. Jeremy stated that he had been contacted by Berman
requesting an endorsement on the note and that because
of a previous engagement, he asked Berman con1e to
his home the following evening for the endorsement.
When Bern1an arrived with the note, no discussion was
ever had wherein the J eremys stated their alleged position of not \Vishing to be bound on the note. Instead,
:Jlr. Jeremy decided to call his attorney on the telephone
to ask his advice about endorsing the note and subsequently endorsed the same without recourse (Tr. 200201).
At this time, the Jeremys were given a perfect
opportunity to clarify any misunderstanding concerning their liability on the note but they did not chose
11
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to do so. The Jeremys' silence at this point clearly
indicates that there never was any agreement between
themselves and Berman that they should not be personally bound on the note.
In 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, at page 479, the author
states:
"Silence frequently speaks with· more decisiveness and eloquence than the clearest of human
actions. Hence, if a statement is made in the
presence of a person, in regard to facts affecting
his rights, and he makes no reply, his silence may
be construed as a tacit admission of the facts
stated ... "
In the case of Casey vs. Burns (Illinois), 129 N.E.
2d 440, 54 ALR 2d 1060, at page 1066, the ~ourt stated:
''Admissions may be implied from conduct
as well as expressed by words, and may sometimes
be implied from mere silence where there is an
opportunity to act or speak and where the circumstances properly and naturally call for action
or reply from men similarly situated."
It appears clear to us that had there been any such
understanding as claimed by the J eremys, they would
have immediately informed Berman that they had no
intention of endorsing the note and that their position
in this matter had been previously discussed and agreed
upon. This was never done. The testimony further shows
that Berman was relying upon the J eremys as guarantors of the note and that the real estate agent, Webber,
obtained a credit report on the Jeremys to determine if
they could meet their obligations under the proposed
12
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sale (Tr. 167). If, in fact, the Jeremys did actually
discuss this problem with the real estate broker, his
failure to relay such discussion to Berman was a breach
of his duty to all parties and neither should be permitted
to take advantage of the situation as it would then
appear obvious that the broker, fearing his sales commission was in jeopardy, concealed the matter from
Berman.
III. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BERMAN
AGREED TO ACCEPT A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT ON
THE NOTE.

In paragraph 8 of the trial court's Findings of
Fact, it states that defendants Jeremy had refused to
endorse or guarantee the note (R. 92). The court made
no finding that this refusal was ever conveyed to Berman. The record is clear that Bennan and the Jeremys
never discussed the question of endorsement of the note
prior to its being transferred (Tr. 140, 237, 259 and 260).
The cases previously cited uniformly hold that where
there has been no agreement between the parties concerning an endorsement, the law implies a ri~ht to
an unqualified endorsement. An agreement between the
parties would necessarily imply a meeting of the minds.
If, as conceded by the J eren1ys, they never advised Berman of their intention not to be bound upon the note,
there could not have been an agree1nent betwen the
parties and Berman would be entitled to an unqualified
endorsement on the note, as a matter of law. The court's
Findings of Fact in paragraph 8 referred to above was

13
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merely a conclusion evidencing the intention of the
J eremys but in no way reflects an agreement between
the parties. The most that can be said is that there
was a mutual mistake of fact as between the parties,
and neither should be allowed to profit under these
circumstances.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the J eremys should be
required to pay the note for $4500.00 which was given
to Berman as partial down payment on the home they
purchased. It would be 1nanifestly unjust to allow the
J eremys to receive credit for this amount on the purchase price but not guarantee the note without an express
agreement from Berman to do otherwise. The record
is clear and shows without qualification that the J eremys
and Berman never discussed the rights of the parties
concerning the note. Absent a clear agreement to the
contrary, Berman is entitled to an unqualified endorse- .
ment on the note as a matter of law.
1The trial court's Findings of Fact manifest no such
agreement but at best merely reflect an elusive state
of mind on the part of the Jeremys at the time of the
transaction. In order to relieve them fron1 responsibility
on the note, there must he a clear finding that the
parties had so agreed. The evidence shows no such
agreement.
We respectfully urge that in accordance with the
pre-trial order entered by the court on May 11, 1961,
14
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that appellant Berman is entitled to judgment in his

favor against the respondents Jeremy, for the sum
of $5,346.64, which amount includes the principal sum
due upon said promissory note (Exhibit D and CPl),
interest, attorney fees and court costs, which said aggregate amount was conceded by all parties to be due
appellant Berman in the event he prevailed in this
action.
Unfortunately, the value of the real property foreclosed by plaintiff is not of sufficient amount to satisfy
the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff on its first
mortgage, and therefore appellant Berman's only recourse on said promisS"ory note is to pursue his recovery
against the J eremys as respondents herein.
We feel the trial court further erred in concluding
that Berman's note and mortgage was not second in
priority but in view of the value of the real property foreclosed by plaintiff, this question of priority between Berman and cross-defendants McRae and Chaffee becomes
moot and of no avail to Berman.
Respectfully submitted,

F. ROBERT BAYLE, and
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
of
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
Attorneys for Cross-complainant
and Appellant
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